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Articles 
The National Bankruptcy Review 
Commission's Section 365 
Recommendations and the "Larger 
Conceptual Issues"* 
David G. Epstein** 
Steve H. Nickles*** 
I. Introduction 
In the chapter of the Report of the National Bankruptcy 
Commission ("Report") entitled "Business Bankruptcy,"1 the 
National Bankruptcy Review Commission ("Review Commission") 
* This paper was presented at the Dickinson Law Review Symposium on Feburary 
5, 1998, and was submitted to the editors of the Dickinson Law Review for publication on 
Feburary 26, 1998. This paper "speaks" as of Feburary 26, 1998, and does not reflect the 
activity of courts, Congress or law review writers since that date. 
** Charles E. Tweedy Chair in Law, University of Alabama Law School. Professor 
Epstein campaigned shamelessly and unsuccessfully for appointment to the National 
Bankruptcy Review Commission. 
*** C. C. Hope Chair of Financial Services and Law, Wake Forest University. Professor 
Nickles campaigned shamelessly and unsuccessfully for Professor Epstein's appointment to 
the National Bankruptcy Review Commission. 
1. Section 365 applies in consumer bankruptcy cases as well as business bankruptcy 
cases. The Review Commission does not expressly indicate that these recommendations are 
limited to business cases. 
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makes four recommendations regarding section 365 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code: 
2.4.1 Clarifying the Meaning of "Rejection" 
The concept of "rejection" in section 365 should be replaced 
with "election to breach." 
Section 365 should provide that a trustee's ability to elect to 
breach a contract of the debtor is not an avoiding power. 
Section 502(g) should be amended to provide that a claim 
arising from the election to breach shall be allowed or disal-
lowed the same as if such claim had arisen before the date of 
the filing of the petition. 
2.4.2 Clarifying the Option of "Assumption" 
"Assumption" should be replaced with "election to perform" in 
section 365. 
2.4.3 Interim Protection and Obligations of Nondebtor Parties 
A court should be authorized to grant an order governing 
temporary performance and/or providing protection of the 
interests of the nondebtor party until the court approves a 
decision to perform or breach a contract. 
Section 503(b) should include as an administrative expense 
losses reasonably and unavoidably sustained by a nondebtor 
party to a contract, a standard based on nonbankruptcy contract 
principles, pending court approval of an election to perform or 
breach a contract if such nondebtor party was acting in 
accordance with a court order governing temporary perfor-
mance. 
2.4.4 Contracts Subject to Section 365; Eliminating the "Execu-
tory" Requirement 
Title 11 should be amended to delete all references to "executo-
ry" in section 365 and related provisions, and "executoriness" 
should be eliminated as a prerequisite to the trustee's election 
to assume or breach a contract. 
These recommendations and the Report's discussion of the four 
recommendations address some, but not all, of the larger conceptu-
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al issues relating to the bankruptcy treatment of leases and 
executory contracts. 
II. History of Bankruptcy Treatment of Leases and Executory 
Contracts 
A. Congressional Enactments 
Congress first dealt with leases and executory contracts sixty 
years ago. In 1938, the Chandler Act2 added sections 63c, 70b, 
116(1), 216(4), 313, 353, 355(2), and 357(2) to the Bankruptcy Act 
of 1898.3 
In the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and subsequent 
amendments thereto [the "Bankruptcy Code"],4 Congress replaced 
these provisions with sections 365, 502(a)(6), 502(g), 366, 559, 560, 
1110, 1113, 1114, 1123(b)(2), 1222(b)(6), and 1322(b)(7).5 In so 
legislating, Congress retained the basic concept from the Chandler 
Act that in a bankruptcy case a debtor can reject or assume or 
assign its leases and executory contracts. 
B. Case Law 
The concept of a debtor election to assume or reject leases and 
executory contracts is not a statutory innovation. More than thirty 
years before the Chandler Act, the Eighth Circuit stated in Watson 
v. Merrill,6 "[t]he effect (of bankruptcy) is to transfer to the trustee 
all of the property of the debtor except his executory contracts and 
to vest in the trustee the option to assume or renounce these. "7 
Professor Countryman traces the case law doctrine of assump-
tion or rejection of leases and executory contracts to the judicial 
doctrine of abandonment.8 Michael Andrew, on the other hand, 
attributes the doctrine of abandonment to case law on assumption 
or rejection of leases, an 1818 English case, Copeland v. Stevens,9 
2. The Chandler Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (amending 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898) (repealed 1978). 
3. Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). 
4. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1944) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code]. 
5. See generally Don Fogel, Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases in the 
Bankruptcy Code, 64 MINN. L. REV. 341 (1980). 
6. 136 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1905). 
7. Id. at 363. 
8. See Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 
439, 440-47 (1973) [hereinafter Countryman I). 
9. 106 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1818). 
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holding that a lease does not become a part of a general bankrupt-
cy assignment unless the assignee accepts (assumes?) the lease.10 
Regardless of which came first-abandonment or assumption and 
rejection of leases-the "chicken" or the "egg'', there was a 
considerable body of case law prior to 1938 recognizing an 
assumption or rejection election in bankruptcy with respect to 
leases and executory contracts. 
C. Law Review Commentary 
Through the years, law review articles have had a uncommonly 
strong impact on the development of the bankruptcy treatment of 
leases and executory contracts. In 1927, Professor MacLachlan 
recommended that the case law on assumption or rejection of 
leases and executory contracts be codified.11 These recommenda-
tions shaped the Chandler Act's provisions on leases and executory 
contracts. Then, in 1973, Professor Countryman published two 
articles on executory contracts in the Minnesota Law Review.12 
These articles, a product of Professor Countryman's work for the 
earlier Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States,13 
influenced the work of that Commission on leases and executory 
contracts. And, Professor Countryman's articles have influenced 
the work of the courts in determining whether a transaction is an 
"executory contract."14 
10. See Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejec-
tion", 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 846, 856-59 (1988) [hereinafter Andrew I]. 
11. See James MacLachlan, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 HARV. L. REV. 583, 
605 (1927). 
12. See Countryman I; Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part II, 
58 MINN. L. REV. 479 (1974) [hereinafter Countryman II]. 
13. Congress created the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States in 
1970 to study and recommend changes in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Act of July 24, 1970, 
Pub. L. No. 9-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970). This Commission submitted its final report to 
Congress in 1973 in two parts: the first part reported general findings and recommendations, 
and the second part was a draft of a bill to implement the recommendations. Report of the 
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, pts I & II, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137 
(1973). These recommendations, with substantial changes, became the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978. See generally Eric Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act 
of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 240 (1997); see also Harry D. Dixon, Jr., Bankruptcy Commis-
sions: Then and Now, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 3 (1996). 
14. See generally 3 JUDGE JAMES F QUEENAN, JR. ET AL., CHAPTER 11 THEORY AND 
PRACTICE, § 17.04 (1994). At a 1988 American Law Institute/American Bar Association 
conference on bankruptcy, Professor Countryman described his Minnesota Law Review 
article's definition of "executory contract": 
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III. Recent Theoretical Evolution 
Law review articles have not only influenced what the 
bankruptcy law of leases and executory contracts now is but also 
have influenced the debate about what the law should be. Law 
review articles by. Michael Andrew provided much of the impetus 
for review (and for new views) of the bankruptcy law of leases and 
executory contracts.15 
At the time of the publication of the first Andrew law review 
article,16 the National Bankruptcy Conference17 was beginning its 
review of the Bankruptcy Code. The Andrew article influenced the 
National Bankruptcy Conference's work on section 365. A 
Working Group of the National Bankruptcy has drafted a compre-
hensive revision of section 365;18 that draft is reproduced at the 
. end of the article. 
Articles by Jay Westbrook19 and others also had a major 
impact on the work of the National Bankruptcy Conference. More 
important, Professor Westbrook's writings form the primary basis 
not only for the Review Commission's four recommendations 
"All it purported to do was extract from the cases we'd had so far what the courts 
had viewed as executory contracts. The only thing that I supplied was an 
explanation, which none of the cases gave, for why there was a requirement that 
performance be due from both sides. The cases were pretty clear that a 
performance was due from both sides or it wasn't an executory contract. I really 
don't see yet why that definition should be changed." 
ALI-ABA, Williamsburg Conference on Bankruptcy-Transcript 85 (1989) (hereinafter 
Williamsburg Conference]. 
15. See Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejec-
tion'', 59 U. COLO. L REV. 845 (1988) [hereinafter Andrew I]; Michael T. Andrew, Executory 
Contracts Revisited: A Reply to Professor Westbrook, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1991) 
(hereinafter Andrew II]. 
16. See Williamsburg Conference, supra note 15, at 53. 
17. The National Bankruptcy Conference is a non-profit voluntary association of about 
65 judges, professors, and practicing attorneys from all parts of the United States. The 
Conference was founded in the middle 1930s to promote the improvement of the bankruptcy 
laws and their administration. The Conference, which meets twice a year, has been 
consistently active in the legislative process. 
18. The senior author of this article served as Reporter to the National Bankruptcy 
Conference Working Group on Leases and Executory Contracts. 
19. See, e.g., Jay Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. 
L. REV. 227 (1989) (hereinafter Westbrook I]; Jay Westbrook, A Fresh Start for Bankruptcy 
Contracts, in 64TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BANKRUPTCY 
JUDGES, 2-31 (1990) [hereinafter Westbrook II]. According to Andrew, his conclusions and 
Professor Westbrook's "ultimate conclusions are all but identical." Andrew II, supra note 
16, at 2. But cf Westbrook II, supra, at 2-32, 2-33. 
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regarding leases and executory contracts but also the Review 
Commission's twenty-one pages of discussion of this area.20 
IV. Five "Larger Conceptual Issues" 
The Review Commission's discussion of leases and executory 
contracts begins with the statement that "instead of undertaking a 
piecemeal analysis of each subsection of section 365, the Commis-
sion reviewed the larger conceptual issues inherent in section 365 
to eliminate confusion on a global basis. "21 We question (i) 
whether the Review Commission reviewed the "larger conceptual 
issues" inherent in section 365 and -(ii) we question whether such 
a review is necessary. 
We understand that the Report may not completely address all 
of the Review Commission's work on these "larger conceptual 
issues." More important, we believe that Congress should 
understand that the Review Commission's recommendations and 
discussion do not completely address the following five "larger 
conceptual issues" relating to the bankruptcy treatment of leases 
and executory contracts: 
(1) What can happen to a section 365 transaction in 
bankruptcy?; 
(2) Which transactions should be treated as section 365 
transactions?; 
(3) Who decides what happens to a section 365 transac-
tion in bankruptcy?; 
(4) What are the obligations and rights of a nondebtor 
party to a section 365 transaction during the course of the 
case?; and 
(5) Which section 365 transactions should be treated 
different from other section 365 transactions? 
A. What Can Happen to a Section 365 Transaction in Bank-
ruptcy? 
1. Overview of Present Code Provision.-Section 365 provides 
for the rejection, assumption, or assignment of leases and executory 
contracts. Understanding rejection, assumption and assignment is 
the first step to understanding what can happen to a lease or 
executory contract in bankruptcy. 
20. See BNA BANKRUPTCY LAW DAILY, March 13, 1997, at xx. 19. 
21. Report of the National Bankruptcy Commission, at 459 [hereinafter Report]. 
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Consider, for example, debtor, D, who at the time of its bankruptcy 
is a tenant at Blackacre Mall under a ten-year lease. The 1997 
lease has a ten year term ~nd provides for rent of $10,000 a month. 
Prior to filing for bankruptcy, D missed three monthly rent 
payments to its landlord BM. 
In bankruptcy, D can reject the lease. On rejection, D is 
obligated to surrender the leasehold, and BM has a limited, 
unsecured claim.22 Even though the rejection occurs postpetition, 
BM's claim is treated as a prepetition claim since BM's rights under 
the lease arose prepetition.23 
Alternatively, D can assume the lease. On assumption, D 
retains the leasehold, and BM has an unlimited administrative 
priority claim for all past, present, and future obligations under the 
lease.24 
D's other alternative under section 365 is to assign the lease. 
Assignment of a lease or executory contract under bankruptcy law 
is different from the general law of assignment. Under contract 
law, if X contracts with Y and X later assigns her rights and 
delegates her contract duties to Z, the assignor X remains legally 
responsible for the performance of the contract.25 Under bank-
ruptcy law, if Chapter 11 tenant D assigns her lease to X, D has no 
further responsibility for future lease obligations.26 
2. Closer View of Review Commission's Recommenda-
tions.-The Review Commission retains but "clarifies" rejection, 
assumption, and assignment. A part of the clarification is a change 
of terms-"rejection" is to become "election to breach,"27 "as-
sumption" is to become "election to perform," and "assignment" 
is to become "transfer." 
22. See Bankruptcy Code§ 502(b)(6). See generally QUEENAN, JR., ET AL., supra note 
15, § 18.24. 
23. See Bankruptcy Code § 502(g). 
24. See, e.g., In re Norwegian Health Spa, 79 B.R. 507 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987); In re 
Mushroom Transportation Co., 78 B.R. 754 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); cf Bankruptcy Code 
§ 365(b). 
25. See E. A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 830-31 (2d ed. 1990). 
26. See Bankruptcy Code § 365(k). 
27. See Report, supra note 22, at 460. While "rejection" is a familiar contract law term, 
only bankruptcy speaks of rejection of contracts. Outside of bankruptcy, an offeree might 
reject an offer; a buyer can reject goods under a contract of sale. Neither an offeree in 
common law contract nor a buyer in an Article 2 contract can reject the contract. 
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a. Assumption.-The Commission does not otherwise 
"clarify" the present law of assumption of leases and executory 
contracts. We respectfully suggest that there are important "larger 
conceptual issues" relating to assumption than whether to retain 
the term "assumption." The present law of assumption results in 
a treatment of section 365 transactions that is markedly different 
from the bankruptcy treatment for all of the debtor's other 
prepetition transactions. Consider, for example, the effect of the 
present law of assumption of a lease or an executory contract on a 
debtor's prepetition and postconfirmation obligations. 
i. Effect of Assumption on Prepetition Obligations.-Chapter 
11 debtor D wants to assume its lease at Blackacre Mall, and D 
owes BM $30,000 for rent missed prior to its bankruptcy filing. If 
D assumes or elects to perform its lease, that $30,000 obligation for 
back rent will be treated differently from all of D's other prepeti-
tion unsecured obligations. Assumption requires D to pay the 
$30,000 unsecured, prepetition back rent claim of landlord BM 
regardless of what, if any, distribution is made to other holders of 
unsecured claims. 28 Why? What is the larger conceptual basis for 
such a rule? 
The National Bankruptcy Conference has suggested a 
conceptual basis for the rule: parties to leases and executory 
contracts, unlike holders of other unsecured claims, have continuing 
performance obligations.29 Assume, for example, that D's lease 
with BM provided for higher monthly payments in the early years 
of the lease. To permit D to assume or perform the lease without 
making these higher, prepetition payments would be to force BM 
to continue to provide new value (use of the leasehold) to D on 
terms different from the terms that it negotiated. 
ii. Effect of Assumption on Postconfirmation Obliga-
tions.-And, if Chapter 11 debtor D wants to assume its lease at 
Blackacre Mall, the postconfirmation obligations under the lease 
will be treated more favorably than any of D's other unsecured or 
even secured obligations. Assumption or election to perform 
requires D to make the payments provided for in the lease or 
28. See Bankruptcy Code § 365(b ). 
29. REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE 
CODE REVIEW PROJECT 137 (rev. ed. 1997). 
1998] SECTION 365 687 
contract without change. If D's lease with BM requires monthly 
payments of $10,000, then assumption of that lease in bankruptcy 
will require D to continue paying the lease rental rate of $10,000 
postconfirmation without change.30 
By contrast, Chapter 11 debtor D can cram down changes in 
its postconfirmation obligations to holders of other unsecured or 
even secured claims. If, for example, Chapter 11 debtor D's other 
store is encumbered by a Large Bank (LB) mortgage providing for 
ten percent interest and one hundred payments of $10,000 a month, 
D can retain that store and, through the provisions of its Chapter 
11 plan and the cram down provisions of Chapter 11 (which apply 
to holders of secured claims but not landlords holding unsecured 
claims), change the interest rate, number of payments, and amount 
of each payment.31 
According to the National Bankruptcy Conference report, "it 
can be argued that it treats the nondebtor to an executory contract 
more favorably than the Bankruptcy Code anywhere treats secured 
creditors."32 With all due (and undue) respect to the National 
Bankruptcy Conference reporter on executory contracts who wrote 
that statement, the more favorable treatment is a fact not an 
argument. What can be argued is that the unsecured, nondebtor 
party to a lease or executory contract should not be treated more 
favorably than a secured creditor. Professor Klee has made such 
an argument: 
"It seems unfair to permit the proponent of a plan to rewrite 
the covenants in a debt instrument to change the payment 
periods and the interest rates for a secured creditor but not to 
permit that to be done to a party with a contractual right under 
a contract or a true lease. "33 
Why does the bankruptcy law of assumption treat parties to 
leases and executory contracts more favorably than bankruptcy law 
treats secured creditors? What is the "larger conceptual" basis for 
such a rule? The argument that lessor BM is continuing to provide 
new value and mortgagor LB is not seems somewhat strained here. 
30. See id. 
31. See Bankruptcy Code § 1129(b)(2)(A). See generally Jack Friedman, What Courts 
Do to Secured Creditors in Chapter JI Cram Down, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1495 (1993). 
32. REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, supra note 30, at 138. 
33. Williamsburg Conference, supra note 15, at 82. It can also be argued that the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in adopting Article 2A 
moved toward treating leases more like secured transactions. 
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b. Assignment.-The present bankruptcy law of assignment 
of a lease or executory contract also raises "larger conceptual 
issues" that are not mentioned by the Review Commission. For 
example, contractual restrictions on assignments of leases and 
contracts that would be enforceable absent bankruptcy are 
unenforceable in bankruptcy.34 
Contractual restrictions on transfers of assets of the debtor 
other than leases and executory contracts, however, are enforceable 
in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy estate's interest in other property 
is no greater than the interest of the debtor.35 While restrictions 
on the transfer of a Board of Trade seat will not prevent the seat 
from becoming property of the estate,36 the restrictions will 
prevent a Chapter 11 debtor from transferring that seat to a third 
party.37 
The "larger concept" that supports the bankruptcy policy of 
disregarding restrictions on the assignment of leases and executory 
contracts has been variously described in commentary and cases as 
a reallocation of values38 and as a balance of the contract right of 
a creditor to receive the benefit of its bargain and the equitable 
right of the debtor to have a right to reorganize.39 Neither the 
commentary, nor cases, nor the Review Commission directly 
explains why these values, but not others, should be reallocated or 
why these contract rights but not others should yield to reorganiza-
tion.40 
c. Rejection.-The Review Commission's more extended 
discussion of rejection raises but does not resolve these same 
34. See Bankruptcy Code § 365(f). 
35. Bankruptcy Code§ 541(a)(l) ("interests of the debtor in property"). 
36. Bankruptcy Code§ 541(c). 
37. Section 541(c)(l)(A) applies only to the transfer that occurs when a bankruptcy 
petition is filed, and what was property of the debtor becomes property of the estate. We 
do not read section 541(c)(l)(A) as affecting a later sale or other transfer of property of 
third parties. Accordingly, the property remains subject to transfer restrictions. See also 
DOUGLAS BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 97-100 (rev. ed. 1993). 
38. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 38.12 
115 (1986). 
39. Cf In re The Circle K Corporation, 127 F.3d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 1997). 
40. Cf Raymond T. Nimmer, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Protecting the Funda-
mental Terms of the Bargain, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 507, 546 (1983) ("Section 365(f) arguably 
is an overbroad intrusion in contractual rights whose potential effect on contracting activity 
is inadequately justified by a desire to capture value for the estate."). 
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"larger conceptual issues," but only in the context of rejection.41 
The essence of the Review Commission's clarification of rejection 
is that rejection is merely a breach and not an avoiding power. 
Since 1938, the bankruptcy laws have stated that rejection of 
a lease or executory contract constitutes a breach as of the date of 
the bankruptcy petition. And, both the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as 
amended and the current Bankruptcy Code provide that a landlord 
who rejects its lease in bankruptcy is not able to use that rejection 
like an avoiding power and recover its leasehold. 
In at least one circuit court decision, a debtor has been 
permitted to use section 365 rejection of an executory contract like 
an avoiding power. In Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond 
Finishers,42 a Chapter 11 owner of a patent used rejection to take 
the patent from its prebankruptcy licensee and transfer an exclusive 
license to another party at a higher price. Congress subsequently 
amended the Bankruptcy Code to provide licensees of intellectual 
property with the same protection from section 365 avoidance as 
lessees of real property. The Review Commission would make 
clear that parties to all of a debtor's leases and executory contracts 
have that same protection. The Review Commission correctly 
explains "if a debtor were empowered to demand possession of 
property from a third party, the bankruptcy process would readjust 
the bargains struck at state law, rather than simply determine a 
claim for breach. "43 
3. Ride-through-Neither the Review Commission's recom-
mendations nor its discussion of the recommendations mentions 
ride-through, but neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Bankruptcy 
Act of 1898 mentions ride-through. 
Reorganization cases under the Bankruptcy Act use the term 
"ride through" to describe the situation in which the debtor neither 
assumes nor rejects the contract or lease. Under the Bankruptcy 
Act case law, the consequences of the debtor's failure to assume or 
reject are (i) the nondebtor does not have a claim in the case 
because there is no breach, (ii) discharge does not affect the 
41. See Report, supra note 22, at 459-65. 
42. 756 F.2d 1053 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986). 
43. Report, supra note 22, at 462. The Review Commission does not explain why these 
bargains struck at state law should be honored in bankruptcy and other bargains-such as 
nonassignability of a lease or executory contract-should not. 
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enforceability of the debt, so that (iii) the lease or contract remains 
an asset and obligation of the reorganized debtor.44 
There are a few reported cases under the Bankruptcy Code 
that attribute the same ride through consequences to leases and 
executory contracts that a Chapter 11 debtor neither assumes nor 
rejects.45 We believe these cases are inconsistent with the Bank-
ruptcy Code's expanded definition of claim. A party to a lease or 
executory contract with a Chapter 11 debtor has a section 101(5) 
claim even before the lease or contract is assumed or rejected.46 
Any such section 101(5) claim would be extinguished when the 
Chapter 11 debtor's plan was confirmed and so would not ride 
through the bankruptcy. Consider the following two examples: 
(1) X contracts to sell beans to D. X delivers the beans to D. 
Before D pays for the beans, D files for Chapter 11 relief. X does 
not file a proof of claim; D makes no specific provision for X in its 
plan. D's plan is confirmed, and X receives nothing from the 
bankruptcy. Under current law, X's rights under its nonexecutory 
contract would not ride through D's bankruptcy. Rather, D's 
obligation to pay on X's claim would be extinguished by the 
discharge. 47 
(2) X contracts to sell beans to D. X delivers some but not all 
of the beans to D. D files for Chapter 11 relief. D's confirmed 
Chapter 11 plan neither assumes nor rejects D's executory contract 
with X. Under sections 101(5) and 1141, X's claim is discharged. 
Under the ride through caselaw, this executory contract rides 
through the bankruptcy, unaffected by the bankruptcy. 
While we do not support the caselaw on ride through, we do 
support the practice of ride-through, at least in Chapter 11, and 
would urge Congress to follow the Review Commission's non-
review of this concept. As the National Bankruptcy Conference 
concluded: 
44. See, e.g., Federal's Inc. v. Edmonton Inv. Co., 555 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1977); In re 
Afar Dairy, Inc., 458 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1972); see generally Countryman II, supra note 13, 
at 561-63. 
45. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 546 n.12 (1984); In re 
Continental Country Club, Inc., 114 B.R. 763, 767 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990). 
46. See Bankruptcy Code § 101(5)(A) ("right to payment whether or not such right is 
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, 
disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured"). 
47. See id. § 1141(d)(l)(A) ("discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the 
date of such confirmation"). 
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(T]here are many cases in which there are thousands of 
ordinary contracts [i.e., purchase orders, equipment leases, etc.] 
which normally "ride-through" without being scheduled and 
without notice being given to the other party. In very large 
such cases, it would be an administrative headache to schedule 
and notify all of them. The debtor and the other party expect 
to perform these contracts without formality. In other words, 
the debtor's failure to schedule such contracts is not accidental 
or inadvertent. The present system presently works in those 
types of cases.48 
B. Which Transactions Should Be Treated as Section 365 
Transactions? 
691 
As discussed above, the bankruptcy treatment of section 365 
transactions differs significantly from the bankruptcy treatment of 
a debtor's other unsecured and secured obligations. In particular, 
the consequences of assumption, or "election to perform," are not 
duplicated elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, the 
answer to the question which transactions should be treated as 
section 365 transactions can have meaningful practical conse-
quences. 
Section 70b of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 is limited to leases 
and executory contracts. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 does not 
define either the term "lease" or the phrase "executory contract." 
Section 365 is similarly limited. And, the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978, like the earlier Chandler Act, does not define either 
the term "lease" or the phrase "executory contract."49 The phrase 
"executory contract" has been variously defined by various courts, 
and there has been substantial amount of writing by judges as well 
as law professors on what is an "executory contract."50 
The Review Commission recommends the elimination of the 
word "executory" from section 365 and uses more than five pages 
of its twenty-page discussion of section 365 to advocate this 
48. REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, supra note 30, at 147. 
49. According to legislative history: "Though there is no precise definition of what 
contracts are executory, it generally includes contracts on which performance remains past 
due to some extent on both sides. A note is not usually an executory contract if the only 
performance that remains is repayment." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 374 (1977). See also 
Williamsburg Conference, supra note 15, at 84. 
50. QUEENAN, JR., supra note 15, § 17.03-.08. 
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change.51 Review Commission arguments for elimination of the 
word "executory" include: (i) "a functional analysis of contracts is 
analytically superior,"52 (ii) "persistent inconsistencies and 
difficulties in identifying an executory contract for bankruptcy 
purposes,"53 and (iii) "valuable contracts may be unassumable on 
account of a strict executory test."54 According to the Review 
Commission, court review of the debtor's decision whether to 
assume or reject would replace the executoriness test:55 "[T]he 
Proposal would streamline the (lnalysis of the debtor's contracts 
and provide a directive to courts to analyze the relevant consider-
ations guiding one's decision to perform, breach of transfer a 
contract, just as a contracting party would do outside of bankrupt-
cy. "56 Outside of bankruptcy, a contracting party might easily 
decide that there are business advantages in paying outstanding 
amounts owed to key suppliers. Assume, for example, that D 
contracted with X for repair work and that X completed her work 
prior to D's bankruptcy filing. All that remains is an account 
payable by D to X. While there are other artisans, D has a 
longstanding and outstanding relationship with X and wants to pay 
X in full even though other holders of unsecured claims may go 
unpaid. Under state law, a debtor-even an insolvent debtor--can 
elect to pay some of its creditors in full and not pay other creditors 
at all. 
51. See Report, supra note 22, at 472-78. While most of the "executory contract" 
controversy and confusion has centered on the word "executory," there can also be 
disagreement as to whether there is a "contract" for purposes of section 365. Consider, for 
example, the provider agreement that the Social Security Act requires that a certified health 
care provider file with the Department of Health and Human Services. If the provider 
agreement is a section 365 transaction, then a third party buying all of the assets of a health 
care provider in Chapter 11 cannot acquire the all-important provider agreement unless it 
satisfies all existing contractual obligations under the provider agreement, including any 
obligation to return prebankruptcy overpayments. If, on the other hand, the provider 
agreement is merely an administrative document memorializing a provider's participation in 
a program imposing statutory obligations, then section 365 and its requirement of curing all 
prepetition defaults will not apply. Compare In re Heffernan Mem'l Hosp., 192 B.R. 228, 
231 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996) (executory contract) with In re Kings Terrace Nursing Home, 
Docket Number ex.: No. 91Bl1478 1995 WL 65531, at *9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 1995) 
(statutory and regulatory requirements independent of contract). 
52. Report, supra note 22, at 476. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. See id. at 474. 
56. Id. at 477 (emphasis added). 
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Under existing bankruptcy law, a Chapter 11 debtor cannot 
assume or "elect to perform" such a prepetition, nonexecutory 
contract unless it obtains court approval under the limited necessity 
of payment exception.57 We do not understand the Review 
Commission to be recommending a large conceptual change in the 
present law barring a Chapter 11 debtor from paying some but not 
all prepetition contracts (i.e., debts) in full. A debtor's accounts 
payable should not be section 365 transactions. 
Nor should a debtor's accounts receivable be section 365 
transactions. Assume, for example, that D performed repair work 
for X prior to D's bankruptcy filing. All that remains to be done 
is for X to pay D. Obviously, a debtor who has completely 
performed its part of the contract prior to bankruptcy wants the 
other party of the contract to pay. A Chapter 11 debtor should not 
have to follow a process of filing a motion to assume with notice 
and an opportunity for hearing in order to obtain payment from an 
account debtors on a prepetition account receivable. 
Because of the unique bankruptcy consequences of section 365 
assumption (or "election to perform"), there needs to be a 
constraint on which contracts are subject to the assumption. The 
limiting language does not have to include the word "executory." 
Instead, the concept should be that assumption (or election to 
perform) is limited to situations in which the debtor would not 
have any right to the other party's continued performance if the 
debt01: ceased its performance. 
C. Who Decides What Happens to Section 365 Transactions in 
Bankruptcy? 
The various consequences of rejection, assumption, and 
assignment can affect not only the debtor and the other party to 
the lease or contract but all claimants. Accordingly, the decision 
whether to reject, assume, or assign should not be made by the 
debtor only. Rather, creditors should be given notice of the 
debtor's election and an opportunity to object with a bankruptcy 
court hearing to resolve any such objection. 
57. See MARTIN BIENENSTOCK, BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION, 423 (1987). See 
generally J. Ronald Trost & Marshall S. Huebner, The Doctrine of Necessity (materials 
prepared in connection with 1997 NYU School of Law Workshop on Bankruptcy and 
Reorganization). 
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Section 365( d) makes the debtor's assumption or rejection of 
leases or executory contracts "subject to court approval. "58 And, 
as noted above, the Review Commission makes "court review" an 
integral part of its recommendations.59 However, there is no 
indication in the Bankruptcy Code as to what test a court should 
employ in approving the assumption or rejection of a lease or 
executory contract. The Report does not directly address what the 
standard of review should be, but the Report can be read as 
advocating "enhancement of the estate"60 or "benefit to the 
estate"61 as the test. 
There are cases under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 limiting the 
trustee's rejection of contracts to those that were burdensome to 
the estate.62 Commentators contended that the connection 
between the law of abandonment and the law of leases and 
executory contracts mandated such a test: "The fact that the right 
of rejection is a part of the right to abandon results in the obvious 
conclusion that a trustee may not reject or disaffirm a contract or 
lease unless the contract is burdensome to the debtor. "63 
As indicated earlier, Michael Andrew questions whether the 
assumption/rejection election evolved from abandonment or vice 
versa.64 He also questions any analogy to abandonment in 
determining the standard a court should apply in reviewing a 
debtor's election with respect to its leases or executory contracts: 
[I]f a trustee abandons valuable property, the creditors can 
complain of a breach of the trustee's fiduciary duty to maximize 
the value of the estate. But in the executory contract or lease 
context, it is not the creditors who complain when the trustee 
wishes to reject in favor of a more appropriate or favorable 
58. Bankruptcy Code§ 365(d). 
59. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
60. Report, supra note 22, at 475. 
61. Id. at 477. 
62. See e.g., In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1942); In re New York 
Investors Mut. Group, 143 F. Supp. 51, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). According to the Review 
Commission, "under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, there was no requirement of court 
approval and notice to creditors for those actions." Report, supra note 22, at 474. Section 
70b of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 does not expressly provide for court approval. Provisions 
in Chapter X, XI, XII, and XIII, however, do require court approval of rejection. See 
Bankruptcy Act§§ 116(1), 313(1), 413(1), 613(1). See generally Countryman II, supra note 
13, at 530-63. 
63. John Creedon & Robert Zinman, Landlord's Bankruptcy: Laissez Les Lesses, 26 
Bus. LAW: 1391, 1395 (1971). 
64. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
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investment of the estate's funds. Instead, it is the nondebtor 
party "to the contract or lease, who argues not that the trustee 
should maximize the value of the estate, but that the trustee 
should maximize the return to that party at the expense of the 
estate. That argument stands abandonment doctrine on its 
head.65 
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Most of the reported cases under the Bankruptcy Act of 
189866 and most of the reported cases under the present bank-
ruptcy law67 have used a "business judgment" test in reviewing a 
rejection or assumption decision. We agree with these cases; we 
agree with Michael Andrew's comparison of section 365 decisions 
to other investment decisions made by a Chapter 11 debtor.68 
Professor Shanker has argued that courts should look at the 
impact of rejection on the non-debtor party in applying the 
business judgment standard.69 Relatively few reported cases under 
section 36570 have expressly acknowledged consideration of the 
impact of rejection on the nondebtor party.71 While it may seem 
unfair that a Chapter 11 debtor can realize a relatively insignificant 
benefit by rejecting a lease or contract that is critical to the other 
party, it is no more unfair than a Chapter 11 debtor realizing a 
relatively insignificant benefit by not making a payment that is 
critical to a small supplier who delivered goods prepetition or to a 
small contractor who did work prepetition. 
65. Andrew I, supra note 11, at 897-98. 
66. See e.g., In re Jackson Brewing Co., 567 F.2d 618 (5th Cir. 1978); In re Tilco, 558 
F.2d 1369 (10th Cir. 1977). 
67. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 523 (1984). 
68. See Andrew I, supra note 11, at 895. 
69. See Morris Shanker, The Treatment of Executory Contracts and Leases in the I978 
Bankruptcy Code, PRAC. LAW., Oct. 15, 1979, at 11, 21. See also Jesse M. Fried, Executory 
Contracts and Performance Decisions in Bankruptcy, 46 DUKE L.J. 517, 523 (1996) ("[T]he 
trustee sometimes has an incentive to reject when rejection makes the estate better off but 
makes the other party worse off by a greater amount-that is, when rejection reduces total 
value."). 
70. Bankruptcy Code§ 1113( c)(3) uses a balancing of the equities approach to collective 
bargaining agreements. 
71. See Infosystems Tech., Inc. v. Logical Software, Inc., Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 'II 71,899 
(D. Mass. 1987); In re Petur U.S.A. Instrument Co., Inc., 35 B.R. 561 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 
1983). 
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D. What Are the Obligations and Rights of the Nondebtor Party 
to a Section 365 Transaction During the Course of the Case? 
The "course" of a Chapter 11 case can be a year or more. 
Increasingly, the decision of whether a lease or executory contract 
is assumed, assigned, or rejected is deferred until the plan confir-
mation hearing.72 Accordingly, there can be a large time gap 
between the commencement of a bankruptcy and a final determina-
tion of the bankruptcy treatment of the debtor's leases and 
executory contracts. Additionally, there is a large conceptual gap 
in the present bankruptcy law as to the obligations and rights of the 
nondebtor parties to executory contracts during this period. 
The Report correctly observes: "Nothing in current bankruptcy 
law excuses the nondebtor party to a contract or lease from its 
performance obligation under the contract or lease during the gap 
period. "73 The Report could also have correctly observed that 
there is nothing in current bankruptcy statutory law that compels 
a nondebtor party to a contract to perform during the gap period 
between the filing of the bankruptcy petition and a court hearing 
on motion to assume or reject and that there is nothing in current 
bankruptcy statutory law requiring the debtor to compensate the 
nondebtor party for such performance.74 There are no provisions 
in the Bankruptcy Code relating to the postpetition performance 
obligations and payment rights of parties to executory contracts; 
although, there are a few reported cases holding that the nondebtor 
party is obligated to perform postpetition.75 
With respect to leases, the automatic stay in essence requires 
the nondebtor party to continue to perform postpetition. The 
lessor is barred by the automatic stay from retaking the premises 
or leased personal property from the. debtor.76 Additionally, 
72. See Bankruptcy Code § 365(d); cf In re Gateway Apparel, Inc., 210 B.R. 567 
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1997) (denying debtor's motion to assume and deferring decision on 
assumption until confirmation hearing). 
73. Report, supra note 22, at 467 (emphasis added). 
74. The nondebtor can, of course, argue that she has satisfied the requirements of 
section 503 for an administrative priority claim. 
75. See In re Computer Communications, Inc., 824 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Whit-
comb & Keller Mortgage Co., 715 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1983); In re Feyline Presents, 81 B.R. 
623 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988). See generally, Douglas W. Bordewieck, The Postpetition, Pre-
Rejection, Pre-Assumption Status of an Executory Contract, 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197 (1985). 
76. See generally Note, Section 365 Versus Section 362: Applying the Automatic Stay to 
Prevent Unilateral Contract Termination in a Bankruptcy Setting, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 935 
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section 365( d) recognizes a right-in at least certain lessors-for 
postpetition rental payments. 
The Review Commission properly recognizes a need for the 
Bankruptcy Code to address more directly the obligations and 
rights of the nondebtor party to a section 365 transaction during 
the course of the case.77 The estate's right to assume (or elect to 
perform) would be meaningless if the other party to the lease or 
contract could not be ordered to continue its performance after the 
bankruptcy filing. However, the other party should be able to stop 
its performance unless its right to compensation for such postpeti-
tion performance is recognized. 78 
Review Commission recommendation 2.4.3 authorizes the 
court to order postpetition performance and to provide "protection 
of the interests of the nondebtor party" during the gap. Although 
the recommendation uses the word "protection," the Report 
explains that protection will take the form of a priority claim for 
compensation measured by contract damages law. The following 
footnote from the Report is helpful to understanding both the 
Review Commission's recommendation 2.4.3 and the National 
Bankruptcy Conference's recommendation paragraph f: 
Although the official recommendation of the National Bank-
ruptcy Conference is different than (sic) the Commission's, the 
NBC's report contains the following discussion that is consistent 
with the Commission's recommendation: "An order for 
temporary performance should also be conditioned on terms 
which will avoid inequity to the nondebtor. For example, it 
may be unfair to expect the nondebtor to purchase costly 
equipment under the contract when the trustee only intends to 
continue the performance of the contract for a fraction of its 
full term. If the contract provides for a lump sum payment at 
the end of the term, an allocation of compensation will have to 
be made to cover the stated time period on a basis that will 
equate to a contract rate. These and like problems may direct 
the trustee to make additional payments, or to reduce the goods 
(1993). 
77. An advertisement for a $22.50, 37 page pamphlet entitled, Rights Under Executory 
Contracts Prior to Assumption or Rejection, states: "Executory contracts prior to assumption 
or rejection is the most complex topic in Chapter 11 cases. Because of this, the topic has 
been left virtually uncovered-until now." This advertisement appears on the last page of 
Bankruptcy Court Decisions, Weekly News & Comment, February 3, 1998. 
78. But see Neil P. Olack, Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases: Right to Adequate 
Protection Prior to Assumption or Rejection, 4 BANKR. DEV. J. 421 (1987). 
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or services to be delivered by the nondebtor or vary the times 
when they need to be tendered. Such protection of the 
nondebtor, whatever it may be called, will be analogous to 
adequate protection under section 361. If no satisfactory 
arrangement can be devised to properly compensate the 
nondebtor for being forced into a temporary contract, then the 
court should not allow it."79 
We urge Congressional consideration of this recommendation and 
explanation.80 
E. Which Section 365 Transactions Should Be Treated 
Differently from Other Section 365 Transactions? 
To date, Congress seems to have avoided any reconsideration 
of the larger conceptual issues of section 365 by enacting special 
interest legislation. When the Bankruptcy Code was amended in 
1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, and 1994, section 365 was amended. 
Section 365 now contains different rules for different kinds of 
leases: 
(i) a provision of section 365 applies only to leases of real 
property in which the debtor is the lessor;81 
79. Report, supra note 22, at 471 n.1139. 
80. A Department of Justice Working Group made a similar recommendation to the 
Review Commission. See The Report of the Department of Justice Working Group, in 
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, 19TH ANNUAL CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY 
AND REORGANIZATION, 752 PLI/COMM 11 (April 1997). 
The Commercial Law League of America, however, opposes the proposal because: 
[I]t may increase litigation surrounding section 365 by giving a significant incentive 
for all non-debtor parties to file motions to obtain temporary orders, because all 
non-debtor parties will want to have the ability to recover the damages specified 
in Proposal 3 (i.e., 'losses reasonably and unavoidably sustained.') Further, the 
CLLA is concerned that the proposal authorizing the filing of motions seeking 
temporary performance could be construed to permit debtors to obtain temporary 
performance orders as a way to modify provisions of their current contracts with 
a non-debtor party. Further, the reference in Proposal 3 to losses reasonably and 
unavoidably sustained may be interpreted too broadly to give a non-debtor party 
a windfall at the expense of other creditors, by recovering losses sustained 
pursuant to a contract that is burdensome to the non-debtor party. Accordingly, 
for the above reasons and because current law already permits the allowance of 
administrative claims for actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the 
estate, the Commercial Law League opposes the recommendation. 
See Russell H. Rapoport & Alan R. Gordon, Recommendations and Comments on Section 
365, 102 COM. L.J. 176, 179-80 (1997). 
81. See Bankruptcy Code § 365(h). 
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(ii) other provisions apply to leases of nonresidential real 
property;82 
(iii) still other provisions apply to leases of nonresidential 
real property that are shopping center leases;83 
(iv) some provisions apply to leases of residential proper-
ty;84 
(v) some provisions apply to leases of personal property, 
other than personal property leased to an individual for 
personal, family or household purposes;85 and 
(vi) there are provisions that apply to a "lease of nonresi-
dential real property under which the debtor is an affected air 
carrier that is the lessee of an aircraft terminal or an aircraft 
gate."86 
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Section 365 also creates special rules for various kinds of contracts 
such as time share plans87 and licenses of intellectual property.88 
And, still other leases and contracts are treated by other sections 
of the Bankruptcy Code such as section 1110 which deals in part 
with leases of aircraft, equipment, or vessels or section 1168 which 
deals in part with leases of rolling stock leases and section 559 on 
repurchase agreements or section 560 dealing with swap agreements 
or section 1113 for collective bargaining agreements. 
These special provisions for certain transactions have generat-
ed numerous practice questions such as whether a transaction 
comes within one of the special provisions. Consider, for example, 
the special provisions for shopping centers. Since the Bankruptcy 
Code presently provides greater protection for the lessor of a 
shopping center than for other lessors, debtors regularly argue that 
the building or buildings in which it is leasing space is not a 
shopping center.89 
Debtors also make "expresio unius"90 arguments with respect 
to transactions that do not come within a special provision.91 
Since the Bankruptcy Code expressly provides that a lessor of real 
82. See, e.g., id. § 365(d)(3), (d)(4). 
83. See id. § 365(b)(3), (h)(l)(C). 
84. See id. § 365(d)(l), (d)(2). 
85. See id. § 365( d)(lO). 
86. Bankruptcy Code § 365(c)(4), (f)(l). 
87. See id. § 365(h)(2). 
88. See id. § 365(n). 
89. Cf. 1 DAVID G. EPSTEIN, ET AL., BANKRUPTCY,§§ 5-20 (1992). 
90. Cf In re Rubin, 154 B.R. 897, 901 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992). 
91. Cf. In re Martin Paint Stores, 199 B.R. 258 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
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property who rejects its lease cannot take the property back from 
the lessee but has no corresponding provision for rejection by 
lessors of personal property, it can be argued that a lessor of 
equipment who rejects its lease in bankruptcy can take the property 
back from the lessee. 92 
The Review Commission acknowledges that enactment of its 
recommendations without elimination of these various special 
provisions "may create new difficulties both for the special cases 
and for the general cases. "93 The Review Commission does not 
otherwise address the question of which, if any, section 365 
transactions should be treated differently from other section 365 
transactions.94 If Congress decides to address the larger conceptu-
al interests inherent in section 365, it should address this question. 
V. Conclusion 
Congress has not reviewed "the larger conceptual issues 
inherent in" bankruptcy treatment of leases and executory contracts 
since the 1930s. We respectfully submit that the Review Commis-
sion did not undertake such a review.95 
A review of the "larger conceptual issues inherent in section 
365" was not a part of the Review Commission's mandate. The 
92. Professor Kenneth Klee has made a different argument for treating rejection of real 
estate leases different from rejection of personal property leases: "I think that there was 
extensive testimony during the hearings. I particularly remember testimony by Peter Coogan 
about the lessee's interest in real property being unique from personalty because he had 
privity of estate as well as privity of contract." Williamsburg Conference, supra note 15, at 
65. 
93. Report, supra note 22, at 476; see also id. at 463 ("this Proposal might be criticized 
as being inadequately remedial since it stops short of dismantling the special interest 
provisions presently in section 365"). 
94. The National Bankruptcy Conference recommends the elimination of the special 
provisions relating to shopping centers, aircraft, vessel, and rolling stock leases as "not in the 
interest of reorganization" and "affecting the debtor's ability to reorganize." NBC, at 143-44 
(1997). Any Bankruptcy Code provision that affords protection to the nondebtor party to 
leases is "not in the interest of reorganization" and is "affecting the debtor's ability to 
reorganize." We respectfully suggest that any congressional comparison include not only the 
needs of the debtor and the nondebtor party in this type of transaction but also the needs 
of the debtor and nondebtor party in this type of transaction as contrasted with the needs 
of the debtor and nondebtor party in other section 365 transactions. 
95. Cf John D. Ayer, Not Dead on the Gurney, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER (WEST), 
Oct. 1997, at 1, 3 ("In defense of themselves, there is plenty that the commissioners can say. 
They didn't have the staff, the support or the hospitable environment of the 1973 
commission. And indeed, they never had a mandate for comprehensive reform."). 
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Congressional Record section-by-section description of the 1994 
legislation establishing the Review Commission states: 
[T]he Commission should be aware that Congress is generally 
satisfied with the basic framework established in the current 
Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, the work of the Commission 
should be based upon reviewing, improving, and updating the 
Code in ways which do not disturb the fundamental tenets of 
and balance of current law.96 
The "larger conceptual issues inherent in section 365" that the 
Review Commission did not review are, in essence, questions of 
"balance." As Judge Robert Jones observed, "[t]he purpose behind 
section 365 is to balance the state law contract right of the creditor 
to receive the benefit of his bargain with the federal law equitable 
right of the debtor to have an opportunity to reorganize."97 We 
believe that, with few exceptions, the bankruptcy courts have 
properly balanced these competing "rights" or policies. 
The Review Commission was well-served by the advice of 
Gerald K. Smith, prominent Phoenix bankruptcy lawyer and 
Deputy Director of the Commission, on Bankruptcy Laws in the 
United States in 1972-73, on leases and executory contracts: 
"Major policy issues were resolved long ago as to the mechanics of 
assumption and rejection. Section 365 of the Code and the cases 
dealing therewith are generally satisfactory."98 
In tum, Congress was well-served by work of the Review 
Commission on leases and executory contracts and by the work of 
the National Bankruptcy Conference. Bankruptcy legislation99 
that adopts the section 365 recommendations of the Review 
Commission as restated in the revised draft of section 365 prepared 
by the National Bankruptcy Conference would be "improving and 
updating the Code in ways which do not disturb the fundamental 
tenets of and balance of current law." 
96. 140 CONG. REC. Hl0,752-01 (daily ed. October 4, 1994) (emphasis added). 
97. Coleman Oil Co. v. Circle K Corp., 190 B.R. 370, 376 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996), aff d, 
127 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 1997). 
98. Gerald K. Smith, Executory Contracts, in NORTON ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPT-
CY LAW 1995-96 721, 722 (1996). This article was one of a series, solicited by Judge Norton 
from members of the American College of Bankruptcy, as advice to the National Bankruptcy 
Review Commission on needed changes in the bankruptcy law. See Norton Annual Survey 
of Bankruptcy Law 1995-96, supra, at ix. 
99. Cf Ayer, supra note 97, at 3. "Grant Gilmore pointed out years ago that 
bankruptcy reform comes in 40-year cycles (1898, 1938, 1978). On this schedule, we aren't 
due for legislation until 2018." Id. 

